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Abstract
This essay takes up the topic of the aesthetics of everyday object
experience. In doing so, it strings together a series of fairly complex
topics as a conceptual framework. Its focus is upon the nature of certain
core features that appear to be at work in giving rise to this kind of
experience. It especially considers the role of such features as the aura
property of phenomenal objects and the self-activation of aesthetic-
interested attention. It gives a level of explanation to the crucial topic of
why we tend to ignore taking an active interest in the aesthetic
dimension of everyday objects. It also examines how we come to identify
ordinary phenomena in contrast to extraordinary phenomena. Finally,
certain issues surrounding the prospects for conceptually delimiting the
scope of the field are considered.
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1. Some preliminary matters of understanding
The individual subjects to be covered in developing this conceptual
framework are, of course, difficult. So let’s first consider the nature of the
aesthetic itself since it represents the overall context of our topic.[1] The
term ‘aesthetic,’ in relationship to sensory experience, has four basic
aspects. It has an epistemic aspect and a cognitive aspect involving
sensorial presentations to us as sentient-sapient subjects, in having an
experience. It has an axiological aspect and an affective aspect involving
the appreciation of such presentations by us as cognizing subjects in
having that experience. The first two aspects represent the stimulus
side, and the latter two aspects represent the response side of aesthetic
experience.
The epistemic aspect of the term ‘aesthetic’ may be characterized to
consist in the effective press of the conditions of a phenomenal object’s
being in a sentient subject’s awareness, in the form of sensorial
presentations at the time and place of the experiential occurrence. The
aesthetic, in its epistemic aspect, has to do with how phenomena
present themselves to us.[2] The cognitive aspect is involved with the
information presented in an experience. The affective aspect of the term
‘aesthetic’ consists in the spontaneously felt response in immediate
connection with the object of an experience. The axiological aspect
involves the appraisal of the value-significances found in having the
experience.
These four aspects variously relate to and overlap each other,
influencing the formation of our aesthetic appreciations. Such experience
sets the stage for taking an aesthetically interested attention as it relates
to a reflectively considered appreciation of its aesthetic worth.[3] In this
reflective standing back, we can distinctively come to appreciate that of
which the experience is of in addition to the having of the experience
itself tout court.[4] In this essay, where required for clarity, aestheticE will
represent the epistemic/cognitive aspects and aestheticA will represent
the axiological/affective aspects of the use of the word.
We may next consider a feature basic to experience. Experience
possesses the dual characteristic of being, in one sense, a continuum
and, in another sense, discrete, in the differentiation sense of this latter
term. In the continuum sense, our experiencing is an undifferentiated
continuous flow. In the differentiated sense, we perceptually experience
only a limited portion of what phenomena are available, in relatively
discrete forms, coming to our sentient sensitivities. The continuum level
of experience serves us as a background out of which discrete
phenomena are or can be foregrounded as individually distinctive
objects of perceptual awareness. It is the discrete aspect that permits
distinguishing kinds of things. It is also where the distinctions of parts to
whole and whole to context relations are revealed to our discriminative
operations. It follows from the background/foreground distinction that the
aesthetic, in the epistemic sense, is an ever-present background
condition, a pervasive continuum of sensorial life. It is a condition upon
which and out of which discrete phenomenal objects manifest
themselves to us, in our experiencing them as the foreground of our
focally concentrated attention. In this sense, the aestheticE is that by
which we first come to be aware and know of sensory phenomenal
objects. The aestheticE, then, is an inherent aspect of all sensorial
experience. AestheticE is that to which we apply aestheticA interest
attention on behalf of appreciating the value rewards afforded thereby.
The epistemic condition of aesthetic experience is an unrestricted flow
as to when, where, and what discrete objects present themselves to us
in interacting with them.[5]
Let’s now examine the term ‘ordinary.’ ‘Ordinary’ has four basic senses
interrelationally forming a temporal/spatial axis and an object/subject
axis, each of which can cut across and condition each other, in its
various uses. ‘Ordinary,’ in its frequent sense, and ‘ordinary,’ in its
distributed sense, form the temporal/spatial axis in correlation with
encountering conditions of experience. ‘Ordinary,’ in its property sense,
and ‘ordinary,’ in its attitude sense, form the object/subject axis,
correlating with the affective conditions of experience. The uses of the
term ‘ordinary’ can be divided into several categories, each with quite
different imports. These categories consist of four non-temporal uses,
three temporal uses, and one either/or.[6] However, two of the non-
temporal category of uses of the term are especially noted here as they
are most relevant to our discussion, in relation to the central role of aura
to be introduced in the next section. These are:
1. the ordinary, in a non-temporal use applied in a
cognitive-descriptive sense to the comparative status of
collectively shared properties of objects as a class; and
2. the ordinary, in a non-temporal use applied in an
affective-appraisal sense to the value status of objects.
In connection with the aura-capacity of phenomenal objects, the use of
the term ‘ordinary’ has two basic modes: an objective mode referring to
aura as a factual property of phenomena, and a subjective mode
referring to a subject’s attribution of qualitative status to an object of
attention. It is at once an attribution taken by the subject stimulated by
the phenomenal object itself in its mutually effective and reciprocal
engagement. In other words, an experience is constituted
simultaneously, on the one hand, by what the subject brings to the
experiential occasion and, on the other, by what the phenomenal object
brings to that engagement. The premise here is that the experiencing of
self and the experienced object are simultaneously specified in the
information available to perception, on the one hand, and one’s memory,
on the other hand, at the conscious level. This is termed, in cognitive
psychology, the co-specification hypothesis.[7]
Finally, consider the word ‘everyday.’ The term ‘everyday’ is a temporal-
order term indicating the cycle of successive, repeated, or recurrent
presentations to our awareness. In the context of our topic, ‘everyday’
suggests recognizing those phenomenal objects that are frequently but
not necessarily literally encountered in everyday or daily life terms. In
other words, it does not mean “all the time” but “more often than not” or
“most of the time.” Everyday frequency encounters can take two forms:
the frequency of coming into contact with an object by virtue of routinely
taking the same route, or the frequency of coming into contact with
multiples of the same object existing distributively in various locations. It
is often said, in the latter case, euphemistically, “some things are just
everywhere.” The term ‘everywhere’ is a distributive-order term
indicating that which is found to be plentiful, abundant, or numerous.
Every discrete phenomenal object must be somewhere, and multiples of
the same phenomena are variously plentiful and variably spatially
distributed, influencing the frequency of their encounter in daily life
terms. The term ‘everywhere,’ in our context, is not taken literally.
Telephone poles and trees, as abundant and widespread as they may
be, are not, after all, literally everywhere. The words ‘everywhere’ and
‘everyday’ together suggest the relative prevalence in space and the
relative pervasiveness through time of phenomenal objects.
We often use the term ‘everyday’ as a synonym for ordinary, indicating
the frequency of encounter with phenomenal objects, specifically those
objects that are taken to be ordinary in their status. However, the
frequency level of experiences is an independent variable to any one
object’s makeup as ordinary. Everyday frequency experience is not
necessarily the same as ordinary object experience. When the term
‘everyday’ is used as substitute for the term ‘ordinary,’ relative to the
phenomenal object’s qualitative status, it can also imply its adverbial
form, ‘ordinarily,’ meaning “in the ordinary course of events.”
Additionally, it can suggest the object’s commonplace state of being
widespread in spatial distribution. This term’s capacity to imply all these
three senses is perhaps why we are drawn to employ it, in substituting
fashion, where we readily associate the everyday with the ordinary as
virtually the same thing.
As an example of ordinary or everyday experience, let us take that of the
bicycle. Most of us would regard bicycles as ordinary objects.
Concerning bicycles that are to be frequently encountered, the Flying
Pigeon bike is, by far, the best example. There are over 500 million of
them widely distributed, in various places in the world. On the other
hand, there are very few Bowden Spacelander bikes in existence. So
the prospect for encountering this particular bike is infrequent, if not
outright rare, by comparison. Imagine the scene of a typical university
campus where bicycles are numerous and are usually distributed in
abundance across the campus. In these situations, experiencing
bicycles is an ordinary experience. This example is one where the term
‘ordinary’ is used in its frequency and distribution senses, in connection
with encountering bicycles. It concerns, in emphasis, the
temporal/spatial axis noted above representing the cognitive aspect of
aestheticE experience of objects.
In the discussion that follows, the term ‘object’ will be used as a
placeholder referring to that which is delivered to sensory awareness,
that is, perceptually experienced. The term ‘phenomenon’ will be used
as a placeholder referring to that which the experience is of and
conditions it. Their combination as ‘phenomenal object’ is used as a
placeholder referring at once to the ontological condition of the stimulus
phenomena and the epistemic condition of the cognized object. The term
‘object’ inclusively covers  entities, things, items, scenes, situations,
events, processes, activities or practices.
2. The instrumental role of aura
Discrete phenomenal manifestations are presented to us as objects by
means of their aura-capacity. Aura is an ontological feature of
phenomenal objects in the form of a stimulus capacity having dual
aspects: a cognitive aspect and an affective aspect.[8] The cognitive
aspect is an emanating circumambient quality of an object leading, within
an experience, to its affective aspect of inducing a feeling, mood, or
spirit. We can only come to know any one phenomena’s affective aura
force as it effectively emerges in an experiential occasion. They are
experience dependent, limited by any phenomenon’s aura-capacity, on
the one hand, and, on the other, cognitively conditioned by our own
sensitive and receptive capacity conditions at the time. The aura capacity
of phenomenal objects, in their energy force aspect, is the overall
effective press upon us operating in degrees ranging from an ordinary
level of power intensity to an extraordinary level of power intensity.[9] In
other words, an aura’s stimulus force can range from negligible to
overpowering. The latter of these cases, that is, the extraordinary case,
often induces the affect we call ‘awe.’
In the overpowering type of aura cases, the discrete phenomenal object,
in and of itself, tends to stand out out from the background continuum of
experience with little endeavor on our part. It is a case where the
phenomenal object itself spontaneously grabs our aesthetic interest. An
example would be driving along a highway at the ocean’s edge and
being motivated to stop to witness a gloriously dramatic sunset. Another
case might be when an old friend suddenly loses a great deal of weight,
going from endomorph to ectomorph in appearance. In affective terms,
the person’s sudden change of appearance may induce the feeling of
awe as to the extraordinary change in how that person looks. However,
the negligible aura-type cases, where the phenomenal object is of a
relatively weak aura force, require that we, on our own, take up an active
interest in the object.[10] In the context of our topic, we specifically take
up an aestheticA interest attention to the particular phenomenal object,
in contrast to practical, moral, political, economic, religious, or historical
interests. It is with the weaker level case of aura-capacity experience
that the ordinary status of phenomenal objects is usually associated and
where the word ‘everyday’ operates as its synonym. It is this type of
case that involves an initiative on our part to take an aestheticA interest
attention toward everyday or ordinary phenomenal objects.
3. The features and workings of everyday phenomenal object
aesthetics
Sensorially presented phenomenal objects are characterized by and
discoursed upon in terms of their form, content, and force. The qualities
of a phenomenal object’s makeup, relating to its form and content, range
from simple to complex. Their energy level of force, as indicated in the
prior section, ranges from negligible to overpowering. It is the level of
force that correlates as the stimulus factor to attention getting. It is the
characteristics of form and content that correlate as the stimulus factor to
interest reward.
In relation to the affective sense of the aesthetic, the greater the
inclusive complexity of the form and content, the richer it is, and the
greater the potential for interest reward. Conversely, the less content
represented by a form and the greater the simplicity of that form, the less
potential there is for interest reward. In relation to the cognitive sense of
the aesthetic, the greater the simplicity of form, the greater the ease of
perceptually grasping that form, and the greater the complexity, the
greater difficulty of apprehension. The distinction at work here is that
simplicity and complexity conditions each influence the cognitive and
affective senses of the aesthetic experience in different ways. In the
affective sense case, complexity has to do with what is expressed. This
is the case where the less value-significant content there is, the less
prospect of reward. The cognitive sense case has to do with how that
content is expressed. It is where the simplicity of form serves the ease of
apprehension of the form itself and the grasp of its content. Regarding a
phenomenal object’s aura force, the greater the level of force, the greater
is its attention-getting potential; the less the energy level of aura force,
the less potential for attention getting.
Of those phenomenal objects we encounter that we come to regard as
ordinary, they are felt to have an aura energy force that tends toward the
negligible level. It is also usually connected with a tendency toward
relative simplicity or plainness in the object’s formal composition. In our
discourse on such objects, we often employ certain synonyms
associated with this plainness characteristic, such as meager, ascetic,
bareness, unassuming, prosaic, pedestrian, and nondescript. The
plainness feature of ordinary objects contributes to their affective pallor
of dullness. Dullness is a deadening or blunting effect on sensibility
leading to apathy or disinterestedness. Examples might be dusting the
household furniture, paying bills, pumping gas in one’s car, or dealing
with an unimaginative, shallow person who talks incessantly on one
subject. Such a person we tag as being a dullard. In such dullness
cases, we often apply certain matter-of-fact type synonyms, such as
unlively, dreary, banal, stale, unexciting, cut-and-dried, insensible,
unfeeling, and unpleasurable, just to cite a few. Adding the impact of the
everyday-frequency level of encounter to such ordinary objects, we incur
exposure to the affects of tedium and satiation.
In our discourse, when motivated by a felt tedium over such ordinary
objects that we encounter with everyday frequency, we tend to apply
synonyms such as sameness, unvaried, uneventful, monotonous,
humdrum, boring, weariness, fatiguing, or tiresome. It is the frequency of
everyday encounters, along with the relative widespread or abundance
of an object, that breeds such a level of familiarity with an ordinary
phenomenal object that we tend to lose interest. Interests readily require
refreshment of newness or novelty and variation to sustain our attention.
It is the spatially widespread presence of ordinary objects, especially
those we encounter with everyday frequency, that has often come to be
regarded and labeled as garden variety phenomena.
Experiencing the cognitive look of plainness and the affective feel of
dullness of ordinary or everyday objects serves to generate certain
dispositions on our part. The pallor of dullness emanating from plain
objects, together with the pall of satiation given rise to by the fatiguing
tedium of frequent encounters, can combine so as to induce a
neutralizing effect. This neutralizing effect engenders indifference
leading to neglect or disregard for taking an active interest in ordinary or
everyday phenomenal objects in relation to their aesthetic dimension.
The neutralizing effect works to reduce our sensitivity, and the
indifference effect works to diminish our receptivity to the aesthetic
interest perspective. The net effect of this indifference and neglect is that
the aesthetic values of ordinary and everyday phenomenal objects, be
they positive or negative in valence, tend to be overlooked and go
unappreciated for the values they afford.[11]
All of these characteristic affects serve to explain why we come to give
so little attention to the aesthetic value dimensions of ordinary,
phenomenal objects. If the characteristics of an ordinary or everyday
phenomenal object is that it is overly simple so as to be cognitively plain
and affectively dull, and if there is an indefinitely large number of them
widely distributed everywhere, and if in everyday frequency one routinely
comes into contact with them, then it is only if we takes a self-activated
aesthetic interest attention in them that we can come to penetrate to the
value affordances that would otherwise be overlooked and go
unappreciated. As Gianluca Consoli reports in cognitive psychology
terms, in coming to our attitudes, our aesthetic interest may be activated
in two different modes, “automatically and spontaneously or intentionally
and deliberatively.”[12] In the case of extraordinary objects, the aura
level intensity commands our attention and our aesthetic interest,
causally working from the world to mind. However, in the case of
ordinary objects with low levels of aura presentation, this requires of our
discretion to self-initiate the aesthetic interest, hence working from mind
to the world. In this case, our coming to the appreciation of the
aestheticA virtues of ordinary or everyday phenomenal objects is, simply
put, up to us.
Let’s return to our example of bicycles as they may be found and
experienced on a university campus. Consider the case where a student
approaches a concentrated mass of bicycles to retrieve his or her own.
However, the student’s attention is immediately drawn to focus on what
is a Bowden Spacelander bike parked among them all. The Spacelander
bike is so unusual in its compelling appearance that the student’s
interest in finding his or her own bike is involuntarily usurped. The
student is captivated by this bike’s extraordinarily unique design.
Contextually, the bike simply stands out with overpowering aura force as
an extraordinary object. The student’s AestheticA experience, in this
case, is compellingly driven by the aura of the aestheticE properties of
the bicycle itself. This example involves, in emphasis, the object/subject
axis noted earlier in connection with the affective aspect of experience.
It is to be noted how often in our discourses on the subjects of the
ordinary and the everyday that we use the terms ‘usual,’ ‘usualness’ or
‘usually.’ ‘Usual’ refers to normative states, in the sense of conformance
to a rule where we apply such synonyms as ordinarily, commonly,
generally, or prevalently as descriptive in matters of fact. It is also used
to refer to normative processes where we apply such synonyms as
regularly, customarily, habitually, or conventionally as descriptive in
matters of course. We use the term rather across the board to mean
usual qualities, usual place, usual time, and usual disposition. These
collectively refer to the what, where, when, and how of things. The word
‘usual,’ in this way, serves as a kind of lynchpin term applied widely
across the modes of the ordinary and the everyday. In contrast, we call
extraordinary phenomena and experiences unusual.
Encountering ordinary or extraordinary phenomena as objects of our
experience is dependent upon personal lifestyle and circumstances. For
example, a person incarcerated in jail, with its high degree of daily
regimentation and enclosed quarters of experience, is to be contrasted
with someone who is an international marketing professional, whose
daily traveling from place to place around the world affords different
opportunities of everyday experiencing relative to the range of
phenomenal objects that are available. A park ranger stationed in
Yosemite National Park is, on an everyday basis, routinely experiencing
an extraordinary phenomenon, the scene of one of the aesthetic
wonders of the world. In this circumstance, the phenomenal object
remains extraordinary, in its qualitative state but, despite its compelling
power, the ranger, apart from the practical responsibilities of work, may
well subjectively suffer a loss of aesthetic interest due to the everyday
exposure to and familiarity with the scene, such that satiation and fatigue
sets in and neutralizes his or her interest leading to indifference and
neglect. Such is the case where everyday repetitive frequency, as the
saying goes, dulls the senses.
Conversely, take an example similar to one that Thomas Leddy once
offered. Consider a professor who, for some years, on a daily routine
basis, in early morning, walks along a certain path to his or her office
building. One day the professor looks down and takes notice, with
aesthetic interest, intrigued by the finely fitted and neat basket-weave-
patterned layout of the path’s brick paving. He or she also notices the
complementary harmony of the rust-red color tone of the brick paving in
relation to the contiguous yellow-green of the dew covered grass of the
glade through which the path takes its course. The professor finds the
overall experience pleasing. He or she may well find this experience not
only pleasant but moving toward the extraordinary end of the spectrum,
despite the ordinariness of the artificial and natural phenomena
presented. Such an experience is engendered through self-activated
interest-taking and the phenomenal conditions that are the object of his
or her notice. The occasions in which we take a self-initiated interest
specifically in the aesthetic dimension of an ordinary phenomenal object
are rather idiosyncratic. In the course of the needs, issues, and concerns
that arise in our daily lives, such occasions are not activated in any
systematic way. They tend to occur in an ad hoc fashion. There are
cases where we might do so at someone else’s invitation or instigation.
4. The role of self-activation of aesthetic-interested attention to the
ordinary
The crucial question of why we do not take a greater, specifically
aesthetic interest in ordinary phenomenal objects has been given a level
of explanation in the previous sections. In them, I suggested two basic
reasons for our tendency to neglect taking an active interest in the
aesthetic dimension of ordinary or everyday phenomenal objects. The
first is that, in the course of our daily lives, there is the competition
between the aestheticA interest and other interests, some of which are
quite demanding of our attention. The second is attributed to the
neutralizing effect engendered by ordinary objects and everyday
experience leading to interest neglect. It is for these two reasons that it
can be said that our taking an aesthetic interest in the ordinary is not
ordinary.
Given the compelling or overpowering nature of the aura force of
extraordinary phenomenal objects to garner our attention, how can or do
we take an aesthetic interest in ordinary or everyday phenomenal
objects of lesser aura force that do not readily and spontaneously attract
our attention?  It appears that we can do so, as already suggested, only
by standing back from other interests and electively take up, with
intentionally directed attention, a concentrated interest in how things
look, sound, smell, feel, or taste for their aesthetic value significances. It
is in this way that we can counter the tendency toward indifference and
neglect of the aesthetic attributes and virtues that may be present in
ordinary phenomenal objects.
We can also balance the overt pressure of attending just to practical
interests. For example, the activity of eating is usually a routine daily
affair undertaken for the practical purpose of nourishing ourselves. In
doing so, we may revert from this interest to attend with aesthetic
interest to the tasteful or distasteful qualities of the food. How often do
we arrive at the food table with stomach growling because of appetite
and, upon one mouthful, exclaim, “Ah! Does this taste good!” It is to be
granted that if one were quite literally starving to death, presumptively an
extraordinary case, such a circumstance might well defeat one from
taking up out of one’s discretion such an aesthetic interest.
Let us return to the example of our university student, who also happens
to be an ardent competition cyclist. His or her racing bike is a Raleigh,
while those of the competitors range from an Arrow, a Debacco,
Pinarello Gan, and Jamis to a Cannondale. One day, out for a training
exercise as a group, they are resting along the roadside and, for the first
time, our student finds him- or herself comparing the appearances of
each of the different bikes in aesthetic terms, admiring different features
of design. In doing so, our student has self-activated an aesthetic
interest attention in how these bikes look and feel, appreciating the
overall aura of their qualities. It is this kind of example that shows the
role of the self-activation of aesthetic-interest attention to everyday
objects that permits and affords appreciation of their value significances
that otherwise may be overlooked and go unappreciated in the course of
daily life experiences.
5. Delineating the field of ordinary phenomenal object aesthetics
What is the basis for the division of the extraordinary and ordinary
categories? What constitutes the field of ordinary phenomenal object
aesthetics? The basis for the division between extraordinary and
ordinary phenomenal objects depends on the distinctive level of the aura
force, form, and content discussed in Sections 2 and 3. The relative
difference in the aura of phenomena is the basis of the differentiation
between the extraordinary and the ordinary. The extraordinary case is
the superlative case; it is the consummate case, in the sense of being
outstanding, compelling, overtly noticeable, strikingly notable and
unusual, exceptional, uncommon, and rare. The extraordinary cannot
have a less than exceptional aura without becoming ordinary. It can be
inferred that that which is ordinary is potentially extraordinary. These two
points together indicate that there is a certain asymmetrical relationship
between the two, one that provides a clue to our ability to recognize and
assign certain objects these statuses. So the question, again, is how do
we sense, that is, recognize something ordinary and distinguish it from
something extraordinary? What is the operational basis for our doing so?
Extraordinary phenomena and extraordinary experiences are
exceptional in aura force and character, and relatively rare in spatial
distribution and temporal frequency. By far, most experiences of
phenomenal objects do not compellingly strike us in their sensory
manifestations to be extraordinary, especially those that induce the
experience of awe and wonder. Those phenomenal objects that we
come to regard as ordinary are recognized on the basis of the
experiential absence of the extraordinary affect. If so, the distinguishing
ground for the recognition of the ordinary is a default condition of not
being extraordinary in force and character. Ordinary phenomenal
objects, as a status category of objects, are those in our experiences
that we find by subtraction, that is, those objects not found in experience
to be extraordinary in compelling aura force and character. If it is not
experienced in aestheticA affect as extraordinary, what remains must be
ordinary. Such ordinary phenomenal objects are affectively
aestheticallyE non-compelling, requiring self-initiated aestheticA interest
in order to be appreciated in that way.
When we express a judgment of aestheticA value upon a phenomenal
object, we are expressing not only an interest in but also an attitude
toward it. In doing so, there is often an ambiguity as whether or not we
are valuing the object itself, or the experience itself, or both. In the
extraordinary object case, it is more about what the phenomenal object’s
aestheticE aura brings to the experiential occasion, in contrast with the
ordinary object case, where it is more about what the percipient subject
brings to the experiential occasion in relation to self-activated interest
and consequent attitude. In relation to this ambiguity, the question is
often put forth in the form: “Is the status of the ordinary determined
objectively by certain unique properties of phenomenal objects or do our
own interests and attitudes determine the ordinary as a special
subjective form of experience?”
The objective side of the issue turns on how the reference to property is
understood. Property understood as a condition of the phenomenal
object of cognition necessarily involves the percipient in mutual
engagement with that stimulus in the form of a reciprocal influence. Any
sensory phenomenon presents itself as an object in an experience by
which it is cognitively and affectively known and recognized as being
either ordinary or extraordinary in status. On this point, Thomas Leddy,
in his article, “The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics,” has it right. He
advances “that [the term] ‘property’ not be [simply] understood in an
objectivist way. The properties appreciated in everyday aesthetics are
neither wholly objective nor wholly subjective. They are properties of
experienced things, not of physical objects abstracted from our
experienced world.”[13] The sentient properties of phenomena are
known within experiencing them as objects of awareness.
6. The Identification of ordinary and extraordinary phenomenal
objects
In general, in order to sort things out and manage the vast array of
phenomena presented to us in experiences, we conceptually collect
discrete phenomenal objects together, assigning them under categories
of type, kinds, or classes. We rather successfully do so, for example, in
the case of the kind flowers. As evidenced in garden books, there is a
rather consistent and settled listing of all those phenomenal specimens
that qualify for the category, along with photo illustrations and texts
descriptive of properties. In this particular case, there are certain readily
identifiable shared standard properties constituting the spectrum of the
category to be relied upon and cited with confidence. We are inclined to
sort our experiences into the categories of the ordinary and the
extraordinary. However, we are also inclined to seek identifying a
spectrum of those phenomenal things of the sensory world that are
ordinary, in contrast to the extraordinary. In doing so, we shift from a
focus on the difference between the categories of the ordinary and the
extraordinary as distinctive kinds to that of identifying the spectrum of
phenomena deemed qualified to be located within each of these
categorical kinds. A spectrum consists of three basic features: an
uninterrupted continuity, representing its consecutive order; an open or
closed range, representing its collective order; and a differentiated
variegation, representing its distributive order. So a spectrum has a
continuum characteristic, a scope characteristic, and a discrete
individuation characteristic.
The attempt to identify a spectrum of individual phenomena within the
category of the ordinary presents a set of difficulties not found in that of
the category case of flowers. In this context, the terms ‘ordinary’ and
‘extraordinary’ are used to refer to an object’s property, not the
frequency of encounter. In relation to the variegation or individuation
factor of the spectrum within each of the extraordinary and ordinary
kinds, the force-referring aura terms, such as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’,
‘compelling’ and ‘negligible,’ along with the form-referring terms of
‘complex’ and ‘simple,’ ‘rich’ and ‘plain,’ are all terms of degrees.
Consequently, any one individually discrete phenomenon may
ontologically possess these aura properties in a gradient, that is, a more-
or-less proportional fashion. Given the case that the aura properties of
any individual phenomena obtain in degrees, there is no definite fixed
location available on the gradient scale of the continuum presenting a
threshold cutoff line by which to clearly identify which discrete
phenomena, in their actual makeup, qualifies them to be included or
excluded within the ordinary category spectrum.
Other difficulties may be recognized in relation to any attempt at pre-
identifying what objects are to be ruled in or out of the spectrum of the
ordinary kind category. Ordinary phenomena can be constituent
components contributing to the composition of an extraordinary
phenomenal object, and extraordinary phenomena may be embedded in
ordinary phenomena. An example of the earlier case is that ordinary
trees are ordinarily plentiful to the landscape at large; however, they
serve to contribute, by their presence, to the aesthetically extraordinary
site of Yosemite Valley. An example of the latter case is a diamond
found in ordinary stone having extraordinary aesthetic qualities. Another
factor is that the ontological state of phenomenal objects is subject to
change affecting their extraordinary or ordinary status over time. For
example, the Great Barrier Reef, one of the wonders of the world, in
current status, is subject to deterioration and diminishment and perhaps
extinction with the onset of global warming conditions.
A further difficulty arises in connection with the range or scope factor of
the spectrum. Any number of phenomena can be or dynamically
become either extraordinary or ordinary such that the categories are
indefinably open-ended in relation to what things are included within the
category. All of these points confirm that our abilities for recognizing that
which is extraordinary and that which is ordinary as phenomenal objects
is not, in a subjective way, intuitively obvious, and neither, in an
objective way, is it empirically evident. It appears that there is no
conceptual or descriptive precision to be had in regard to pre-
establishing, apart from the actual having of an experience, what
constitutes inclusion in the spectrum of ordinary phenomenal objects.
The spectrum of discrete phenomena is open ended as a category, not
closed in range. The ordinary, as a category, is not one that can be
precisely circumscribed. Given the indicated difficulties, it seems that we
rely on our immediate experience for taking the specific measure of the
aura property of any one phenomenal object that would place it within
the spectrum of ordinary in categorical status.
We do, in fact, have cognitive experiences of ordinary and extraordinary
objects giving rise to affectively ordinary and extraordinary valuable
experiences. It is the case with ordinary phenomenal objects that, on the
basis of our discretionary activation of an interest, any such phenomena
can become an object of aestheticA consideration and appreciation. By
doing so, we set up the experience to that extent, allowing the
phenomenal object’s aestheticE qualities be recognized for its aestheticA
rewards. In these cases, the self-activation of an aesthetic interest works
to  orient and open our receptivity to take in and be moved by the
aesthetic dimension of ordinary objects. If all this is so, taking an
aestheticallyA active interest in the aestheticsE of ordinary and everyday
objects is a matter of personal discretion.
Taking an aesthetic interest in everyday ordinary objects is subject to
one’s personal sensitivity, receptivity, and predisposing inclinations,
along with being dependent upon one’s personal lifestyle conditioned by
one’s cultural and locational circumstances. The aestheticA attitude or
value disposition arrived at is derived from the attention and interest one
takes. These are the conditions brought to the experiential occasion by
the subject. On the other hand, such an experience is dependent upon
the objective condition as to the state of the aura’s form and force that a
particular phenomenal object brings to the occasion. These two
conditions meet and are encapsulated in the moment of an experience.
In the end, the distinctive threshold point of recognition as to what is the
extraordinary case or the ordinary case can only be determined in an
individual case of immediately occurring experiences where the ordinary
is recognized by default of not being compellingly extraordinary. These
classificatory assignment operations, supplemented with initiating an
aesthetic interest, is at the basis of forming the experiences of the
ordinary everyday objects.
If so, then the debate over which phenomenal objects are ordinary prior
to their being experienced is a red herring. This appears also to be the
case for everyday encounters. The everyday frequency of experiential
encounters cannot serve to identify the aura state of any individual
phenomenal object’s being ordinary. Additionally, appealing to everyday
frequency cannot lead to precisely establishing a delimited range of
phenomena to categorize as ordinary. Such discussions over the
restrictive or expansiveness of objects that are to be included under the
notion of the everyday is categorically indeterminate.[14] The cited case
of the ranger in Yosemite Park allows that even the extraordinary can be
an everyday experience. If anything, a high-level frequency of everyday
encounters, for the most part, tends to work against our taking an active
interest in the aestheticE qualities of ordinary phenomenal objects and
their appreciation.
Relative to ordinary phenomena, there is, in general, no a priori limit to
what can become the object of aesthetically interested experience. The
only limiting factor on the ordinary experience is the extraordinary
experience of extraordinary phenomena. Jerome Stolnitz claimed in his
article, “The Aesthetic Attitude”, that “any object at all can be
apprehended aesthetically,” adding “the aesthetic attitude can be
adopted toward “any object of awareness what ever.”[15] And, Paul Ziff,
in his article, “Anything Viewed,” contended “anything that can be
viewed is a fit object for aesthetic attention.”[16] Marshall Cohen, in his
article, “Aesthetic Essence,” goes so far as to remark that even “the
experience of brushing one’s teeth” can be an aesthetic experience if
attended to with this interest.[17] Sherri Irvin’s remark that “our everyday
lives have an aesthetic character that is thoroughgoing and available at
every moment, should we choose to attend to it” leans toward the
context of ordinary phenomenal objects.[18]
It should be noted, in relation to Stolnitz’s second quoted remark, that a
case can be made that it is not the attitude that drives aesthetic attention
but interest taking. Attitude, on the one hand, is taking a position,
posture, or stance toward something, in the belief that it is of a certain
constitutive makeup or value valence. Interest, on the other hand, is to
become attentive to something, out of curiosity, in wanting to know or
learn something about that thing. It is not attitude that determines the
possible recognition of the aesthetic qualities of ordinary objects but the
self-discretionary activation of the aesthetic interest as a perspective that
directs the attention taken in ordinary and everyday objects. The
attitudinal stance of the value-significance of a phenomenal object, be it
positive or negative in final judgment, is a consequence of taking that
interest.
7. Conclusion
Our topic has been that of aesthetic appreciation, with a focus on the
ordinary phenomenal objects of experience, in contrast to the
extraordinary. We have discussed the ordinary status and impression,
for the most part, under the associated synonym, ‘everyday.’ Our
experiential lives center around the value-significances afforded by the
 omnipresence of the aestheticE qualities presented to us by the
phenomenal objects we encounter. We have treated the ordinary in its
frequency sense, the ordinary in its distributive sense, the ordinary in its
property sense, and the ordinary in its attitude sense. But arriving at
one’s attitudes, dispositions, opinions, or appreciations of ordinary
phenomenal objects lies with our aesthetic perspective interest taking.
Our interest taking is tied to our sensitivity to and receptivity for taking an
active interest in the diversity of aestheticA values afforded through
aestheticE presentations. In the case of ordinary phenomenal objects,
we deploy our aestheticA-interest directed attention in search of such
positive values that may be available but unrecognized.[19] If aesthetic-
interested attention is to be better understood and encouraged on behalf
of the aesthetic qualities such ordinary objects offer, it would seem that it
is entirely up to us to do so. We, on our own discretion, are faced with
volunteering to move from indifference and neglect of the aestheticA
interest to an actively interested concern over the ordinary or everyday
phenomenal objects that are, after all, most of what is present in our
daily lives. Transforming the ordinary experience into an extraordinary
experience by self-activated interest in their aesthetic dimension may
potentially dispel at least some of the dullness endemic of the
ordinary.[20]
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